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Abstract
Prediction and forecasting have now fully reached peace and conflict research. We define forecasting as predictions
about unrealized outcomes given model estimates from realized data, and predictions more generally as the assign-
ment of probability distributions to realized or unrealized outcomes. Increasingly, scholars present within- and out-
of-sample prediction results in their publications and sometimes even forecasts for unrealized, future outcomes. The
articles in this special issue demonstrate the ability of current approaches to forecast events of interest and contributes
to the formulation of best practices for forecasting within peace research. We highlight the role of forecasting for
theory evaluation and as a bridge between academics and policymakers, summarize the contributions in the special
issue, and provide some thoughts on how research on forecasting in peace research should proceed. We suggest some
best practices, noting the importance of theory development, interpretability of models, replicability of results, and
data collection.
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No matter how I turn it over in my mind, the number
one task of peace research always turns out to be that of
prediction [...] (J David Singer, 1973)
Although rarely articulated explicitly, ultimately being
able to forecast peace and conflict is a fundamental moti-
vation for peace research (Singer, 1973). Indeed, reliable
forecasting or early-warning systems that could indicate
risks before conflict erupts or escalates would make it
possible to prepare for, intervene in, or build resilience
against deadly conflicts (Harff, 2003). Moreover, by
designing forecasts as contingent on policy interventions,
they could be powerful tools to guide policy: by comparing
forecasts of the expected risk or intensity of armed con-
flict given different conflict-preventing policies, the risks
associated with particular interventions can be more
fully understood, and the case for (non-)intervention
made evidence based.
Forecasting peace and conflict was long viewed with
considerable skepticism and often considered unfeasible
(e.g. Stephens, 2012). However, new data projects, new
theories, and innovative methods – as demonstrated in
this special issue – are taking us closer to generating
conflict forecasts that are sufficiently precise to be policy
relevant. We focus on forecasts of phenomena that are
sufficiently regular and frequent to support the
Corresponding author:
havard.hegre@pcr.uu.se
Journal of Peace Research
2017, Vol. 54(2) 113–124





estimation of statistical models that typically requires
large-N datasets. ‘Black swans’ (Taleb, 2007) such as the
onset of a world war or the collapse of a superpower are
typically too infrequent to qualify as such, and rather
tend to fall into the realm of ‘judgemental forecasters’
(Tetlock, 2005). We do briefly discuss how large-N
work can be made relevant for rare, high-impact events,
provided that such events can be credibly construed as an
agglomeration of smaller, more regular events.
What does the term ‘forecasting’ mean in peace and
conflict research? The usage in the literature varies some-
what. We here define forecasts as predictions about unrea-
lized outcomes given model estimates from realized data.
‘Early-warning systems’ we define as systematic proce-
dures set up to provide regular forecasts for conflict-
related events along the lines of, for instance, daily
weather forecasts. ‘Prediction’ is a more general concept,
and refers to the assignment of a probability distribution
to an outcome based on such model estimates, but may
be applied to realized as well as unrealized outcomes.
More colloquially, forecasts are predictions about tomor-
row given information we have about what has happened
up to today. This means two inputs are required to make
forecasts: realized data and estimators; and one output is
produced: predictions.
Understood this way, forecasting and prediction have
now fully arrived in the field of peace and conflict
research (Schneider, Gleditsch & Carey, 2011; Metter-
nich & Gleditsch, forthcoming). Increasingly, scholars
present prediction results and forecasts (O’Brien, 2010;
Brandt, Freeman, & Schrodt, 2011; Schrodt, Yonamine
& Bagozzi, 2013), while specialized conferences and
workshops are addressing forecasting frameworks. This
focus is mirrored in the policymaking world that has
benefited from scholarly work on forecasting (King &
Zeng, 2001; Harff, 2003; Goldsmith et al., 2013; Bell
et al., 2013). Beyond structural (e.g. Beger, Dorff &
Ward, forthcoming; Goldstone et al., 2010) and time-
series forecasting designs (e.g. Metternich et al., 2013;
Brandt, Colaresi & Freeman, 2008), rational choice
(e.g. Bueno de Mesquita, 2011) and judgmental forecasts
(e.g. Tetlock, 2005) have made their way from the aca-
demic to the policy world. In fact, many large interna-
tional organizations and governments rely on regional or
global forecasts of conflict in order to address humanitar-
ian, military, and political crises. However, the quality of
these efforts outside of academia is hard to assess, as they
are often not transparent or replicable, if not outright
secret, and the methodologies employed have rarely been
subjected to the scrutiny of academic peer review. Despite
the recent surge of large prediction and forecasting efforts
(Boschee et al., 2015; Doyle et al., 2014; Goldstone et al.,
2010; De Groeve, Hachemer & Vernaccini, 2014), the
discipline has not overcome the challenge with a lack of
shared standards as well as tools for assessing and compar-
ing predictive performance (Ward, Greenhill & Bakke,
2010; Brandt, Freeman, & Schrodt, 2014; Carment,
2003). In addition to demonstrating the ability of current
approaches to forecast events of interest, and their impli-
cations for prediction-based public policies, this special
issue contributes to filling this gap by laying out best
practices in conflict forecasting.
A brief history of forecasting in peace research
Systematic conflict forecasting is not new and is deeply
rooted in the systematic study of peace and conflict (Chou-
cri, 1974; Bueno de Mesquita, Newman & Rabushka,
1985; Gurr & Lichbach, 1986; Bremer, 1987). We find
it useful to think of the history of forecasting in the peace
research literature as three generations of studies.
The first generation of conflict prediction was inspired
by the work of Sorokin ([1957] 1962), Richardson
(1960a), and Wright ([1942] 1965). It was heavily influ-
enced by the foundation of the Correlates of War Project
in 1963 aiming to systematically accumulate scientific
knowledge about war (Small & Singer, 1982). Early-
warning purposes were explicitly among the aims of this
effort (Singer & Wallace, 1979). Early events-data proj-
ects (that collect data on individual events of the size
typically reported by an individual news report) also high-
lighted forecasting (e.g. Azar et al., 1977). These efforts,
pioneered by Azar (1980) and McClelland & Hoggard
(1968), provided templates for collecting fine-grained data
sufficiently effective to approximate real-time conflict
early warning.
This first enthusiasm for conflict prediction faded,
however, and throughout the 1970s and early 1980s
explicit efforts to use statistical models to predict or warn
against armed conflict were relatively rare.1
The second generation of conflict prediction contrib-
uted especially two critical innovations. Bueno de Mes-
quita (1980, 1983, 1984) made explicit the link between
theory and conflict prediction by using game-theoretical
models to predict armed conflict as well as other foreign
and domestic policy events. In addition, from the late
1980s Philip Schrodt has been building statistical models
based on extensive news source data to predict armed
conflict. Schrodt (1988, 1991) used methods from
1 Zinnes & Muncaster (1984) and Ward (1984) are among the few
cases of forecasting efforts during this period.
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artificial intelligence and machine learning, including
neural networks, to predict state-based conflict. Such
methods are now increasingly being used in the disci-
pline. Schrodt was also a pioneer in moving away from
the widely used country-year datasets constructed from
the Correlates of War collection of data and similar
sources.
Schrodt, Davis & Weddle (1994) introduced algo-
rithms to automatically classify and code political events
based on large numbers of news articles. These tech-
niques have since been further refined and now allow
the discipline to use increasingly more fine-grained data
to code both dependent and independent variables.
While the country-year format pushed the discipline
forward (Gurr & Lichbach,1986; Harff & Gurr, 1998;
Gurr & Moore, 1997; Beck, King & Zeng, 2000),
empirical analysis and forecasts alike are increasingly cast
on a daily, weekly, or monthly level (e.g. Schrodt &
Gerner, 2000; Brandt, Freeman & Schrodt, 2011; Doyle
et al., 2014). This is reflected in the increasing demand
for spatio-temporally disaggregated event data (Ceder-
man & Gleditsch, 2009; Weidmann & Ward, 2010).
The focus on early warning garnered substantial inter-
est in the policy community. The third generation of
conflict prediction thus started with the development
of the US government-financed State Failure Task Force
(SFTF, later re-named the Political Instability Task
Force PITF). The goal of the PITF was to predict a long
range of political instabilities ranging from coups and
revolutions to armed conflict two years before they
occurred. Goldstone et al. (2010) conclude that the
PITF studies ‘have substantially achieved that objective’.
Beginning in the mid to late 2000s, conflict prediction
became a very active subdiscipline of conflict research
and is now increasingly seen as a ‘mainstream’ effort
by the wider scientific community (Schneider, Gleditsch
& Carey, 2011). This has been aided by the realization,
most succinctly communicated by Ward, Greenhill &
Bakke (2010), that prediction often is a better way of
evaluating research than more traditional significance
and p-value based approaches, a discussion we return
to below.
Prediction is now used throughout the discipline of
peace and conflict research. Greatly helped by the
advances in computationally intensive methods to collect
and analyze data, researchers increasingly follow Phil
Schrodt in using automated event coded data from news
wires to study, for instance, how public opinion affects
the Israeli–Palestinian conflict (Brandt, Colaresi & Free-
man, 2008), or whether news data can be used to predict
the outbreak of the First World War (Chadefaux, 2014).
The focus is not confined to armed conflict, but extends
to predicting irregular leadership transfers (e.g. Beger,
Dorff & Ward, forthcoming), one-sided violence (e.g.
Scharpf et al., 2014), nonviolent movements (e.g. Che-
noweth & Ulfelder, 2017), and many other forms of
political violence (Ward et al. 2013) and its conse-
quences. These studies have in common that they use
data at a granular level (sometimes days or months
instead of years) to predict conflict in the short term.
Other studies rely on country-year data to produce long-
range predictions. Hegre et al. (2013, 2016) forecast civil
conflict many decades into the future, as do Witmer
et al. (2017) in this issue. Forecasting is a thriving sub-
discipline in peace and conflict studies and will, we fore-
cast, continue to grow in the coming years. The most
important questions regarding the future of forecasting
in peace research pertain to its shape, not its importance.
We believe that the interplay between theory and fore-
casting will increasingly take place alongside data and
methods development as crucial elements of forecasting
approaches in our discipline.
The shape of forecasting to come
The bulk of quantitative peace and conflict research has
traditionally been interested in explaining the relation-
ship between explanatory factors and outcomes of inter-
est. Yet, the majority of applied statistical studies in our
discipline focus on estimating marginal effects (along
with their standard error) while almost completely dis-
regarding the evaluation of model predictions. Fore-
casting puts the ability of researchers to generate
predictions or predicted probability distributions for
outcomes such as war, civil conflict, or one-sided vio-
lence at the forefront of the research agenda and seeks to
limit the traditional exclusive reliance on statistical sig-
nificance to assess scientific progress. Prediction can
take many different shapes and with this special issue
we want to take the opportunity to highlight areas
where it increases our ability to explain and areas where
researchers face a trade-off between prediction and
explanation.
When evaluating the relationship between prediction
and explanation it is important to recognize the different
purposes of forecasting. Forecasting can help researchers
to test, improve, and build their theories. However, fore-
casting not only fulfills scientific objectives; it also
enables policymakers to formulate evidence-based poli-
cies regarding peace and security issues. Forecasts can
help designing polices or act merely as an early-
warning tool. Below we discuss both purposes.
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Prediction to evaluate theory
Several of the articles in this issue show the utility of
prediction for evaluating or testing theories or hypoth-
eses. Ward, Greenhill & Bakke (2010) forcefully argue
that the almost exclusive emphasis on classical hypothesis
testing and analysis of p-values has undermined efforts to
improve predicting the outcomes we are actually inter-
ested in (e.g. peace, armed conflict, or war). Although
this problem has been discussed for decades,2 there is an
increasing awareness in the social sciences that the focus
on statistical significance sometimes promotes findings
that capture very small effects with limited ability to pre-
dict the outcomes of interest. Prediction provides one
answer to this debate because researchers can evaluate the
extent to which explanatory factors deemed theoretically
important improve the prediction of the outcome. Hence,
theoretically derived factors that are consistently associated
with better predictions should increase the researcher’s
confidence about their substantive meaningfulness.3
Prediction is also a guard against overfitting, when
combined with out-of-sample and cross-validation
approaches. In this issue, for example, Blair, Blattman
& Hartman (2017) use survey data to predict local-level
violence. They compare a wide range of models and show
that a more parsimonious model outperforms more exten-
sive models. The problem is that p-values alone generally
say little about the real-world impact of a variable or the
concept it operationalizes. The danger is that an exclusive
reliance on p-values in combination with larger datasets
drives the discipline to identify an ever-growing list of
increasingly marginal variables, since p-values are directly
related to sample size. This is a problem that will only be
compounded by the increasing availability of ‘big data’
sources. Contributors to this special issue show that their
estimated effects are not just statistically significant, but
also matter substantively, as their models help improve
out-of-sample predictive performance.
Hegre, Nygård & Ræder (2017) extend this advantage
through using forecasting techniques to study the size and
intensity of the conflict trap. They argue that previous
studies that focus on single parameters have underesti-
mated the effect of the conflict trap. This also points to
another benefit of prediction. Peace researchers, and
indeed social scientists more generally, usually build
‘models’ to explain particular phenomena. In model test-
ing, however, focus is often restricted to a single, or a few,
parameters of interest. Prediction, in contrast, lends itself
more easily to evaluating the power of an entire model,
but also to the assessment of the predictive power of
particular variables.
From a philosophy of science standpoint, we argue
that the role of theory is central to the explanation and
prediction of social behavior and that forecasting may
help us to rigorously test theories. Based on Hempel,
Schrodt (2014: 290) takes this line of thought very far
when arguing that ‘explanation in the absence of predic-
tion is not scientifically superior to predictive analysis, it
isn’t scientific at all! It is, instead, “pre-scientific”’. In the
social sciences, where complete isolation of causal factors
and their precise measurement are virtually impossible,
this statement is likely too strong. Explanation in the
absence of prediction is certainly possible, as is prediction
without explanation (cf. Elster, 1989: 8–10; Tetlock,
2005: 14–15). Still, prediction can be a powerful tool to
help us develop and improve theoretical explanations of
conflict and peace as a supplement to hypothesis testing.
Conversely, theoretical reasoning is essential to improve
the predictive power of models without limiting their
interpretability (for an example, see Gleditsch & Ward,
2013). By analyzing the characteristics of forecasts that do
particularly well or particularly poorly in the out-of-
sample evaluation, we can learn about the features of our
models and theories that improve our understanding of
the empirical data. Colaresi & Mahmood (2017), in this
special issue, propose a modeling framework adapted from
machine learning – build, compute, critique, and think –
for doing just that.
This learning process promises more sophisticated
models of how measurable explanatory factors are related
to outcomes. Factors or their combinations are typically
meaningless in themselves; it is theory that attributes
meaning. Indeed, many of the ‘usual suspect’ variables
are proxies that on their own cannot exert causal effects.
For example, a high ‘infant mortality rate’ is a robust
predictor of political instability, but arguably only as a
proxy for the theoretical concept of ‘weak state capac-
ity’.4 Since factors also rarely predict with high precision
in isolation, theoretical and empirical models that suc-
ceed in capturing the contingent and interactive nature
of individual factors are likely to do better in this type of
evaluation. Likewise, the failure of a single factor to
2 Galtung (1967: 372–373), for instance, notes it explicitly and
argues for rather calling p-value tests ‘tests of generalizibility’ rather
than ‘tests of significance’.
3 In the case of forecasting as defined above, readers will have to wait
until the forecasting period is over to make such evaluations.
4 Thanks to Phil Schrodt and Nils Weidmann for input to this
discussion.
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improve prediction does not necessarily mean that it has
no place in a social-science model. This, we think, would
be a welcome although challenging aspect of the evalua-
tion of theory through prediction.
In addition, many predictions are not directly causal,
but instead reflect ‘signals’. Gohdes & Carey (2017) in
this issue, for instance, show that killings of journalists
are regularly precursors to increased repression. Canaries
in a coal-mine can be used as early-warning signals, but
the causal relationship between signal and outcome goes
through an unobserved third variable: toxic gas leakages
in the coal-mine case, and changes in government’s will-
ingness to use extreme measures in the repression case.
Another caveat pertains to the role of reverse causation,
when there are theoretical and empirical reasons to believe
that there is also a causal effect of Y on X. In this case, X
could be a good predictor, but this will be difficult to
discern. In our reading, our current understanding of such
problems is partial at best, although reduced form models
that solve for such endogeneity are a promising way
forward.
Forecasting and outcome prediction
A trade-off between explanation and prediction arises
when researchers are simply interested in increasing the
predictive power of their models, and not primarily con-
cerned with the understanding of the data-generating
mechanisms that is driving, for instance, peace duration,
conflict escalation, or war onset. This trade-off applies
particularly to the area of machine learning where the
combination of computational power and the availability
of big data have produced highly flexible and non-
parametric methods. While being extremely flexible in
the sense that machine-learning algorithms can adapt to
non-linear and higher-order relationships, this can come
at the price of reduced interpretability. In machine learn-
ing approaches, tracing back the most important predic-
tors can be difficult. For instance, methods relying on
ensemble techniques are powerful because they average
over multiple models (Montgomery, Hollenbach &
Ward, 2012). Unless great care is taken in how to specify
models and report the results (see Ward & Beger, 2017
for helpful suggestions), the contributions of individual
components in an ensemble are difficult to discern. If
such methods mis-classify important instances of peace
or conflict, it may be difficult to identify parts of the
model that improve its predictions.5
Prediction and forecasting efforts are most useful when
they help us understand when our theoretical model hits
the mark, when it is (widely) off, and the extent of uncer-
tainty associated with attained insights. Informative pre-
dictions ask for explanation, and any explanation worth its
weight should predict. Neural networks, random forests,
and other non-parametric approaches often exhibit severe
limitations when it comes to their ability to generate
meaningful policy advice, simply because these tend to
obscure what and how to manipulate the real world to
avoid undesirable outcomes, including conflict.6
With proper attendance to such interpretability
issues, machine-learning techniques will obviously play
an increasingly important role in the future, especially
when it comes to early-warning systems that do not
necessitate a full understanding of why an outcome of
interest is about to unfold. Reflecting the current main
trends in the conflict-forecasting literature, this special
issue highlights the role of simpler statistical estimators as
recognizable representations of the theoretically
deducted data-generating mechanisms. If we have a good
albeit partial grasp of the ‘true’ model for how peaceful
relations transform into conflictive relations (or vice
versa), we may represent this in an estimator and a model
specification and make very precise forecasts. If the fore-
casts are not accurate, we may first consider revising the
modeling approach so that it conforms more closely to
the theoretical model. Since all parts in the models have a
deductive basis, possible improvements to the model are
relatively easy to identify (provided the theory is a correct
representation of the real world). From this perspective,
forecasting is seen simply as a part of the scientific pro-
cess of building and improving theories.
Forecasting to bridge the gap between basic
and applied research
This special issue stresses that forecasting enables conflict
researchers to bridge the gap between basic and applied
research. Forecasting political instabilities (Goldsmith
et al., 2013), regime change, mass killings (Harff &
Gurr, 1998), and war (Hegre et al., 2013, 2016) are
important preconditions for implementing adequate pol-
icy responses, building resilience, and preparing early
5 Colaresi & Mahmood (2017), Colaresi, Hegre & Nordkvelle
(2016), and Ward & Beger (2017) provide some guidance for how
to help identify the contribution of individual explanatory factors in
ensembles.
6 Machine-learning procedures can still be useful for theory
development where they identify where predictions from a
particular model succeed or fail. See Colaresi & Mahmood (2017)
for a discussion.
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action. Given resource constraints, when reacting to con-
flict around the world it is important that policymakers
can assess risks, calculate costs and benefits, and condi-
tion their responses accordingly. Translating basic polit-
ical science research into forecasting tools is therefore an
important avenue of bridging public policymaking with
the academic community.
Ultimately, the goal for the international community
should be to prevent armed conflict. In 2015, the UN
member states conducted a large-scale review of the tools
and approaches used to respond to violence (UN, 2015).
The overarching conclusion from that review was that
the UN system paid lip service to prevention, but had
not really invested anything near close to the necessary
knowledge or resources to it. Anticipation is at the heart
of efficient prevention of armed conflict. By continu-
ously improving forecasting tools, peace research will
be delivering an important public good to the interna-
tional community.
But for prediction to be useful, it must be embedded
in a theory of how the processes that are modeled oper-
ate, and how they affect the outcome of interest. For
example, Hegre, Nygård & Hultman (2016) forecast
how the global incidence of war changes with various
UN peacekeeping policies, while Cederman, Gleditsch
&Wucherpfennig (2017) examine how various forms of
accommodative policies toward ethnic groups contribu-
ted to the decline of ethnic civil war after the end of the
Cold War.
However, forecasts are clearly not certain statements
about the world. Just like weather forecasts, conflict pre-
dictions provide some informed guidance about possible
scenarios. Forecasts do not tell decisionmakers what they
should do, but rather what is likely to happen if they do
nothing. Current research is also exploring how best to
assess the consequences of possible future public policy
interventions (Hegre et al., 2016; Weidmann & Saleh-
yan, 2013; Clayton & Gleditsch, 2014). These
approaches are still in their infancy and their ethical
implications need to be further considered in a broader
debate. They will also become more useful when moving
away from simple point predictions. Point predictions
are often accompanied by uncertainty estimates, but an
alternative is to produce full density forecasts such as
Bayesian posterior probabilities. For density forecasting,
the goal is rather to forecast the full underlying probabil-
ity density function of the data-generating mechanism
over the outcomes of interest.7
A particular concern here is the role of prediction as
self-fulfilling or self-containing prophecies. Chadefaux
(2017) in this issue discusses how, for instance, forecasts
indicating an increased risk of warmight prompt countries
to attack now, perhaps before a power shift, so that the
initial predictions are invalidated. However, he also notes
that an improved ability to anticipate conflict is more likely
to have the opposite effect. States that underestimate the
risk of war may behave more recklessly or demand larger
concessions in negotiations than those that have more
appropriate estimates, that will take steps to reduce the
risk.8 As such, war will to some extent always be ‘in
the error term’ (Gartzke, 1999). At the individual level,
social competence implies an ability to anticipate the
reactions and behaviors of others, including the ability
of foreseeing hostile interactions among other members
of the individual’s social group. Well-functioning social
groups continuously use such forecasts to adapt behavior
and reduce friction. The set of armed conflict forecasting
efforts in this issue is the systematic, large-scale, data-
driven analogy to such social skills. If we are able to
anticipate violent behavior, we obviously are in a better
place to react to it. Clearly, high-quality forecasts of
conflict can be misused just as psychopaths misuse their
social skills, but that does not in any way invalidate the
importance of prediction by itself. Moreover, transpar-
ency about methods and techniques as well as public
availability of this helps safeguard against misuse.
Policymakers may in particular want to have reliable
forecasts of unexpected, high-impact events – the ‘black
swans’ (Taleb, 2007). Forecasting extremely rare events
such as world wars using statistical methods is unfeasi-
ble.9 Judgmental forecasts (Tetlock, 2005) are likely to
be more useful in such cases. However, large, unusual
wars can be seen as a large cluster of smaller events of
more normal types. Statistical approaches that identify
typical temporal and spatial escalation patterns may pro-
duce warnings about situations that have the potential to
become very deadly. When combined with low-level
events data, the development of dynamic simulations
in Hegre et al. (2013) and Hegre, Nygård & Ræder
(2017) is one suggested approach to achieve this.10
Another promising avenue is provided by the demonstra-
tion that the severity of wars and other forms of political
violence follows power-law distributions – that is, that the
7 Thanks to Patrick Brandt for input on this.
8 See Richardson (1960b: 12) for a similar reasoning.
9 See Ward & Beger (2017) for a discussion of the rare-events
problem.
10 The ViEWS project (http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/views/) is
developing such a model.
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probability that a war escalates from 1,000 to 10,000
deaths is the same as that of moving from 100,000 to 1
million (Richardson, 1960a; Cederman, 2003; Clauset,
Young & Gleditsch, 2007). A better understanding of
why wars display this regularity would help anticipate
infrequent but extremely deadly quarrels.11 Moreover, a
move toward density forecasting where one can focus on
the extreme tails of the forecasting distribution will help
focus on the most extreme outcomes.
The contributions
The articles in this special issue discuss several of these
topics in more detail. Below the contributions are dis-
cussed in alphabetical order.
Blair, Blattman & Hartman (2017) show that
individual-level survey data from selected locations in
Liberia can be harnessed to provide useful forecasts of
post-survey risk of violence in the towns the respondents
reside in. Moreover, when comparing a number of dif-
ferent model specifications employing a variety of analy-
tical techniques, they find the most parsimonious model
to outperform the others. This result is of interest to
builders of real-time early-warning systems, since it indi-
cates that they may be able to do well even when mon-
itoring a limited number of indicators.
Cederman, Gleditsch & Wucherpfennig (2017) revi-
sit an explicit forecast articulated by Gurr after the end of
the Cold War, namely that thanks to a rise in govern-
ments’ accommodative politics towards ethnic groups,
ethnic civil war would be declining in the years to come.
With the benefit of more than a decade of new data and
analyses that mimic the postulated causal mechanisms,
Cederman at al. find support for Gurr’s conjecture about
the ‘waning of ethnic warfare’. Moreover, they find that
this decline appears to have been driven by politics of
accommodation and compromise.
Chadefaux (2017) complements the other articles in
the issue by analyzing the extent to which financial mar-
kets have been able to anticipate the onset of interstate
wars. They do not seem to have succeeded historically:
yields on government bonds systematically increase after
wars start. Moreover, the article shows that a model that
uses government bond yields as predictors of interstate
wars is poorly calibrated in the sense that it systematically
underestimates the risk of conflict onset. A model that
uses news sources as predictor for the same set of out-
comes is better calibrated.
Chiba & Gleditsch (2017) explore whether dynamic
information about mobilization and the behavior of
actors from event data can help improve an existing
forecast model of civil war that relies on relatively static
measures of horizontal inequality (Buhaug, Cederman &
Gleditsch, 2014). While their findings suggest some sup-
port, the contribution of events data to improving pre-
dictive power is somewhat limited.
Colaresi & Mahmood (2017) draw on lessons from
machine learning and propose an adapted Box’s loop
(Blei, 2014) to guide conflict researchers in building better
models to explain conflict. The loop consists of four itera-
tive steps: build, compute, critique, and think. The central
idea is that researchers should explicitly incorporate and
use model criticism to improve their models instead of
relying on robustness tests to, essentially, shield their
models from criticism. Colaresi &Mahmood (2017) illus-
trate the utility of this framework by illustrating how it
can improve out-of-sample forecasts for armed conflict.
Daxecker & Prins (2017) use forecasting to study the
relationship between the availability of lootable resources
and armed conflict. They focus on maritime piracy and
argue that such piracy is one potent way in which rebel
groups can finance rebellion. They use data from Africa
and East Asia and show that including dynamic factors
measuring piracy improves predictive performance of
their models, compared to a baseline excluding these,
both in and out of sample.
Gohdes & Carey (2017) examine whether incidents
of journalist killings – interpreted as a sign of deteriorat-
ing respect for human rights – can help predict subse-
quent increases in repression. Analyzing a new dataset,
their results show that especially in countries with lim-
ited repression initially, journalist killings are frequently
followed by human rights deterioration.
Hegre, Nygård & Ræder (2017) construct forecasts
for the incidence of armed conflict into the future in
order to study the conflict trap. The focus is on compar-
ing forecasts under different scenarios rather than on the
forecasts themselves. The study shows that an onset of a
new armed conflict in a country substantively increases
the long-term expected incidence of conflict. Corre-
spondingly successful de-escalation of conflict has large
positive, long-term effects. As such, this forecasting exer-
cise can inform decisions regarding how much effort to
invest in conflict prevention.
Schneider, Hadar & Bosler (2017) explore the
conflict-forecasting potential of economic indicators.
They show that tourism sector stocks on the Tel Aviv
Stock Exchange perform better as predictors of whether
ceasefire agreements in the Levant hold or not than a11 See Pinker (2011, ch. 5) for a discussion of possible explanations.
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careful codification of the assessments of experts in lead-
ing newspapers following these conflicts.
Ward & Beger (2017) present a near real-time six-
month forecast model of irregular leadership changes for
most countries in the world. Their approach relies on
ensemble Bayesian model averaging that combines seven
different thematic models, each based on a split-
population model that disentangles incidence and timing
of leadership changes. Overall, the approach yields high
out-of-sample accuracy. In addition, Ward & Beger
(2017) also reflect upon issues of prediction and fore-
casting in peace science more generally.
Weidmann & Schutte (2017) demonstrate that
night-lights data can be exploited at much finer resolu-
tions than before. While these data enable very good pre-
dictions of economic performance at the country level,
they improve the prediction of household-level wealth
even more. This is an important contribution because it
shows how remote-sensing data can be used to predict
outcomes of interest in areas where we otherwise have
limited data sources. By combining them with spatial data
on violence, state reach, health care, and many other
issues, it is possible to examine the economic precondi-
tions and consequences of politics at the local level.
Witmer et al. (2017) provide geographically disaggre-
gated forecasts of violent conflict patterns in Africa, pro-
jecting for the period 2015–65. Their forecasts integrate
climatic and sociopolitical factors, and include various
forecasts under alternative scenarios for climate change,
political rights, and population growth. Among others,
they find that if political rights will continue to improve,
then this can neutralize effects of population growth and
rising temperatures that would otherwise drive conflict.
Forecasting the future direction of forecasting
The articles in this special issue suggest that forecasting
will play an increasingly important role in peace research.
They also indicate some particularly fruitful avenues for
research. We consider the following important:
Methods/best practices
A benefit of the null-hypothesis significance testing
(NHST) research framework is that it has given the scien-
tific community a problematic but shared standard for how
to evaluate evidence. For prediction and forecasting, a sim-
ilar evaluation framework presently does not exist. This
special issue takes steps in the direction of agreeing on a
set of common standards to evaluate predictions. We do
not want, however, to arrive at a new ‘p-value’ system for
prediction. Instead, the discipline needs to learn to livewith
a more flexible system that communicates multiple aspects
of a model’s performance and reflects ambiguities in its
evaluation. Indeed, a recurrent argument in this special
issue is that any single-statistic evaluation of results is likely
to lead to a suboptimal accumulation of knowledge.
The articles in this special issue point to some clear
best practices that should start to lay the foundation for a
more stable shared framework for prediction, and, even-
tually, for establishing empirical evidence for theoretical
frameworks. In particular:
1. Researchers need to look at predictions both in-
sample and out-of-sample even if their main
focus is a traditional empirical analysis and they
have no ambition to provide forecasts. Evaluating
(out-of-sample) predictions is necessary to har-
ness their power to guard against overfitting, and
to ensure that we focus on substantive impact.
True out-of-sample forecasts, such as those pro-
vided by Ward & Beger (2017) in this special
issue, should be the ideal.
2. The various measures used to evaluate predictive
performance have different strengths and weak-
nesses (see Brandt, Freeman & Schrodt, 2014).
In this special issue, most contributors report
variations of the Brier score, the area under the
ROC curve (AUC/AUROC) and precision-recall
(P-R) curves. These metrics are flexible and have
well-understood strengths and weaknesses.
Researchers should not rely on a single metric
and further research needs to more thoroughly
investigate and propose ways of weighing or com-
bining these under various conditions.12 Monte
Carlo experiments exploring the properties of
such metrics would be very welcome.
3. Prediction and forecasts should be used to further
the efforts to ensure replicability of scientific
results. Transparency at all steps of the chain that
produces the prediction is crucial to guarantee
that results can be replicated.13
4. Predictions need to be presented visually in ways
that are meaningful to readers. Colaresi &
12 For the more restricted case of developing better forecasts we agree
with Wang et al. (2016) on the need to develop open and shared test
beds against which different forecasts can be tested in a comparable
manner. The construction of such test beds through ImageNet has
been integral for the tremendous success of the field of machine
processing and recognition of images.
13 This point is even more relevant given how important peace
research and the Journal of Peace Research have been in promoting
replicability in research.
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Mahmood (2017), for instance, develop a novel
way of visualizing which cases fit the model, and
which are left unexplained. Similarly, contribu-
tors such as Chiba & Gleditsch (2017) and Wit-
mer et al. (2017) use maps to efficiently visualize
the geographic variation of the predictions as well
as predictive power plots. Weidmann & Schutte
(2017) use customized figures to illustrate how
their predictions differ across estimators.
Theory development
As discussed above, forecasting and out-of-sample eva-
luation put theories to a different type of test than clas-
sical hypothesis testing. Correspondingly, an increased
focus on forecasting calls for reformulation of existing
theories and raises new questions that, in turn, call for
new theory-building efforts. In particular, prediction
shifts focus from statistical to substantive significance,
and it more easily allows us to gauge the real-world
impact of theories. It also allows us to get back to focus-
ing on the performance of a model or a theory instead of
focusing on single parameters. This, arguably, can also
serve important bridge-building efforts between quanti-
tative and qualitative researchers.
Interpretability
We have highlighted the trade-off between interpretabil-
ity and forecasting performance and argued for empha-
sizing the former. It is possible to improve on one front
without necessarily sacrificing the other, however, and
future forecasting efforts should strive to strengthen the
ex-post interpretability of flexible and non-parametric
forecasting approaches (e.g. machine-learning based
forecasts).
Data
In order to produce timely and truly useful forecasts, we
need high-quality data. Particularly promising for the
development of ambitious armed conflict early-warning
systems are the ACLED (Raleigh et al., 2010) and
UCDP-GED (Sundberg & Melander, 2013) data proj-
ects that are both very detailed and have frequent and
regular update schedules. One ambitious effort to
employ these data sources for early warning is the Vio-
lence Early Warning System (ViEWS) project in which
several of the authors of this special issue are involved.14
Moreover, to provide consistent forecasts beyond the
immediate future, data collected must adhere to defini-
tions that are constant over both time and space. This
requires further efforts into standardization. Past research
at the country-year level benefited greatly from the
shared standard for what constitutes the unit of analysis
developed by Gleditsch & Ward (1999), based on the
pioneering work by the Correlates of War Project. Cur-
rently, the lack of similar standards for structuring con-
flict data involving different actors at various
spatiotemporal scales impedes scientific progress (Tollef-
sen, Strand & Buhaug, 2012).
Prediction also brings to the fore the well-known
problem of missing data. It is more important than ever
to get a good handle on missing-data problems, since it is
hard to obtain a forecast for a unit for which we lack
crucial data. An innovation to these issues proposed in
this special issue is to use forecasting techniques to
improve data with estimated values, as Weidmann &
Schutte (2017) do when they use light emission to pre-
dict economic wealth.
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